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Informed Consent: Does the First Amendment Protect
a Patient's Right to Choose Alternative Treatment?
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1990s, our society witnessed significant
breakthroughs and achievements in medical care. 1  Despite the
technological sophistication of contemporary medicine, certain
established legal doctrines continue to govern interactions in the
medical industry.2 Particularly, doctors and patients heavily rely upon
the doctrine of informed consent, which provides that an individual
has the right to determine what will be done with his or her own
body.3
Although this doctrine is well established, determining the
scope of the required disclosure has always presented difficulties,
especially in the sphere of non-traditional alternative methods of
treatment.4 In interpreting the doctrine of informed consent, the
courts have faced many controversial questions. For example, if a
patient wishes to have an abortion in a state that does not permit such
a procedure, should her doctor be required to inform her of those
states that allow abortions? 6 Can a physician in a federally funded
family planning clinic advise her patients of different methods of birth
control and abortion?7 Should a physician be prevented from using
See generally Wayne L. Pines, New Challenges For Medical Product
Promotion And Its Regulation, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 61 (1997).
2 See Elysa Gordon, Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The
Notion ofInformed Waiver, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321 (1996).
3 See Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
4 See MICHAEL COHEN, COMPLIMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE:
LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 60 (1998) (discussing the adequacy
of informed consent).
5 See id. at 60-61.
6 See generally EI-Amin v. Yale - New Haven Hosp., No. CV-900303287
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (adjudicating a situation where a Connecticut resident who gave
birth to to a hydrocephallic child was not informed of the alternative of abortion even
though it would have been an option in a neighbouring New York).
7 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-178 (1991) (upholding regulations
that banned federally funded family planning clinics to provide abortion counseling to
patients).
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ozone therapy8 in cancer treatment simply because it deviates from the
accepted biomedical model?9 Can a physician advise his patient of
the medical use of marijuana?' 0 These questions raise a variety of
issues, such as how much information is a doctor required to disclose
to a patient under the informed consent doctrine, what are the rights of
physicians and patients in their communications and, what is the
extent of permissible government intrusion into the physician-patient
relationship. 11
This Note will address these controversial issues and argue for
the expansion of the rights and guarantees afforded to doctors and
their patients under the informed consent doctrine as applied to
avaliable alternative treatments. In addition, this Note will discuss the
possible constitutional arguments a patient can make on behalf of her
right to choose the best available treatment. It will first discuss the
development of the doctrine of informed consent, the standards used
for disclosure of alternative treatments to patients and, the exceptions
to disclosure requirement. It will then present an overview of how the
informed consent doctrine is currently applied to alternative
treatments. Furthermore, the Note will discuss the "government
standard" of disclosure in terms of constitutional considerations.
Analyzing the government's role in the communication between a
doctor and her patient, I will address the issues surrounding the First
Amendment and the restrictions placed on a patient's right to know
about alternative treatments and the physician's right to free speech.
Finally, I will discuss recent developments in constitutional law
8 Ozone therapy is an alternative cancer therapy implemented to avoid
invasive medical practices. See Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including
Alternative And Complementary Medicine In Insurance And Regulatory Schemes, 38
ARIz. L. REV. 83, 118 (1996).
9 See Atkins v. Guest, 601 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1993) (where the physician's use of
ozone therapy as an alternative cancer treatment made him the target of a medical board
investigation).
10 See Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding
unconstitutional the threats of prosecution made by federal drug enforcement officials to
physicians for advising patients regarding the medical use of marijuana).
11 See generally Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-
Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV.
201, 203 (1994) (discussing whether restrictions on the content of doctor-patient speech
violate the First Amendment).
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regarding the protection of patients' and physicians' rights in the
sphere of alternative treatments. I will conclude that recent legislative
and judicial developments have created a positive trend toward
enhancing the freedom of communication between physicians and
their patients, thereby allowing patients to give more fully informed
consent to freely chosen effective methods of treatment.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
"The [issue] of informed consent is deeply rooted in legal
jurisprudence."' 2  According to the requirements of the informed
consent doctrine, physicians must inform their patients about the
nature, consequences and alternatives of the recommended
treatment. 13 The courts' discussion of a "patient's inherent right to
information about treatment and risks" dates back to 1767.14 In the
earlyl900s, courts began charging the physicians with a duty to
describe the intended surgical procedures and to obtain the patient's
consent.1 5 When a doctor failed to fulfill these obligations, some
courts held the doctor liable for battery and breach of the duty to
disclose. 16 Between 1900 and 1960, the medical community began to
determine what a physician's duty of disclosure encompassed and
how much information was to be provided to a patient.' 7 In 1914, the
court in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital18 established the
patient-oriented disclosure standard by stating that "every human
12 Dorothy Duffy & Martha C. Romney, Medicine and Law: Recent
Developments in Peer Review and Informed Consent, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 331, 345
(1991).
13 See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983). See
also Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246 (Wash. 1980).
14 See Duffy & Romney, supra note 12 at n.124 (citing Slater v. Baker &
Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767)).
15 See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (holding that although
the physician was permitted to operate on one ear, the physician's medically sound
decision to operate on the other ear constituted battery).16 See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15.
17 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772-773 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Duffy &
Romney, supra note 12, at n.128.
18 211 N.Y. 125 (1914); Duffy & Romney, supra note 12, at n.129.
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being of adult ,ears and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body."' 19
"Informed consent," 20 as a legal term, was first introduced in
the United States in 1957 in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr., University
Board of Trustees,21 where the court required a physician's disclosure
to the patient of "all the facts which mutually affect the rights and
interests of and the surgical risks, hazards and dangers, if any . ,,22
The court in Salgo explained that failure to disclose any facts
necessary for a patient to give an informed consent to the treatment
would result in the imposition of liability on the physician.2 3
Although the doctrine of informed consent has been widely
used in litigation since 1957, concerns regarding the appropriate
standard for disclosure of information to the patients continue to
appear before the courts. 2 4 Discussing the requirements of informed
consent, Dorothy Duffy and Martha C. Romney provide the
"six elements of information that are generally
required for consent to be considered informed: the
diagnosis; the nature and purpose of the treatment or
19 Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129. Judge Cardozo held that "the wrong
complained of [was] not merely negligence. It [was] trespass." Id.
20 Informed consent is defined as:
[A] general principle of law that a physician has a duty to
disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical
community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his [or her] patient as to whatever grave risks of
injury might be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his
[or her] own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing
the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at
all, may intelligently exercise his [or her] judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable
benefits.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). See generally Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice. A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219
(1985).
21 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1957). See Duffy & Romney, supra note 12, at 346,
n.130.
22 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181; Duffy & Romney, supra note 12, at n.131.
23 See id. at 346.
24 See generally Duffy & Romney, supra note 12.
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procedure; the expected outcome and probability of
success; the material risks, benefits, and
consequences; the alternatives and supporting
information regarding the alternatives; and the effect
of no treatment or procedure, including the effect on
the prognosis and material risks associated with no
treatment. 25
Furthermore, the health care provider appears to be responsible for
obtaining informed consent before the provider begins treatment.26
II. THE STANDARDS FOR DISCLOSURE OF ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS TO
THE PATIENTS
To require the disclosure of alternatives in the treatment of the
patient, there first has to exist a standard for determining which
alternatives must be disclosed. 7 Referring to the general standards of
disclosure for informed consent, there are currently two options: (1)
the professional disclosure standard28 and, (2) a prudent patient
standard.29 The professional disclosure standard requires health care
providers to inform the patients about the alternatives that would be
disclosed by a reasonable physician, of similar training and
experience, under similar circumstances.
30
The majority of jurisdictions adhere to the professional
25 S. FEUTZ-HARTER, NURSING AND THE LAW 47 (1989).
26 See id. at 45.
27 See Halle Fine Terrion, Informed Choice: Physicians' Duty to Disclose
Nonreadily Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 491, 502 n.48 (1993)
(discussing the disclosure standards under the informed consent doctrine in various
states).
28 The professional disclosure standard requires health care providers to
disclose the alternatives that would be disclosed by a reasonable physician of similar
training and experience in similar circumstances. See Logan v. U.S., 742 F. Supp. 402
(W.D. Ky. 1990)).
29 The "prudent patient" standard requires the level of disclosure that an
average reasonable patient may need to make a meaningful choice of treatment. See
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D. C. Cir. 1972); Duffy & Romney, supra note 12,
at 347-348, n.152.30 See Duffy & Romney, supra note 12, at 347-48.
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standard, making the patient's "right to know" depend upon the
medical custom in a particular community.31 The testimony of an
expert witness is required to establish the physician's negligence in
non-disclosure. 32 The prudent patient standard requires the level of
disclosure that an average, reasonable patient may need in order to
make a meaningful choice of treatment.33  Those courts that have
adopted the prudent patient standard 34 have held that the "protection
of the patient's fundamental right of physical self-determination -
the very cornerstone of informed consent doctrine - mandates that
the scope of a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and
alternatives be governed by the patient's informational needs., 35
These courts have apparently assumed that doctors are
unlikely to disclose all the information that is necessary for patients to
control their own medical treatment decisions.36 Furthermore, the
courts point out that in some cases a professional consensus regarding
the scope of disclosure simply may not exist, thus providing doctors
with unlimited discretion.37 As the court stated in Cobbs v. Grant,
"unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable with the basic
right of the patient to make the ultimate decision regarding the course
of treatment to which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected., 38
31 See generally Richard E. Shugrue & Kathryn Linstromberg, The
Practitioner's Guide to Informed Consent, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 881, n.30 (1991)
(listing the cases and jurisdictions adhering to the professional standard of disclosure).
See also Terrion, supra note 27, at 502 n.48.
32 See generally Duffy & Romney, supra note 12, at 347.
33 See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
34 See Shugrue & Listromberg, supra note 31, at n.30 (referencing the
decisions which implemented the "prudent patient standard" of disclosure).
35 See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786. The physician's duty to disclose is
measured by the needs of the patient to obtain "information material to the decision" and
the patient's right to decide "is at the very foundation of the duty to disclose." Id
36 See Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context:
The Special Case, 61 WASH. L. REV. 367, 373-74 (1986).
37 See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (stating that "even if there
can be said to be a medical community standard as to the disclosure requirement for any
prescribed treatment, it appears so nebulous that doctors become, in effect, vested with
virtual absolute discretion").3 1Id. at 10.
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DISCLOSuRE REQUIREMENT
Exceptions to the requirement of disclosure under the
informed consent doctrine constitute a compromise between the
physician's interest in providing health care and the patient's
autonomy. 39  This compromise represents a shifting of decision-
making authority from the patient to the physician, thereby changing
the regular balance in the informed consent cases.
40
First, a physician will not be liable for violating a duty to
disclose in an emergency situation.41 The emergency exception may
create ambiguity since the definition of "emergency" remains
unclear.42 Some authors have defined "emergency" as a patient's
inability to give consent or receive the information.43  The
"emergency" may include lack of time for adequate disclosure, which,
if given, may violate "a compelling interest of the patient, the medical
profession or society in general. 44 Other scholars have suggested the
application of the emergency exception when the patient is
unconscious or unable to authorize treatment, and the possible harm
from non-treatment outweighs the risk of the proposed medical care.
45
The gist of the emergency exception is the impossibility of the
patient's decision-making due to extreme circumstances or the
patient's general incompetence.46 Thus, "the consequence of insisting
upon informed consent where it is patently impossible to obtain it, is
39 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 497 n.28; Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to
the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in
Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 414-16 (1979).
40 See Ten-ion, supra note 27, at 506 n.67; see generally Mark Garwin, The
Duty to Care- the Right to Refuse,19 J. LEGAL MED. 99, 103 (1998) (discussing the
changing roles of patients and physicians in medical treatment decision- making.)
41 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 507.
42 See id.
43 See Meisel, supra note 39 at 415.
44 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 507.
41 See id.
46 See id. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(creating an exception to disclosure when the patient is incapable of consent); Sard v.
Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977) (exempting physicians from disclosure duty
when a patient is unable to consent due to mental incompetence).
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that the patient will go untreated.
4 7
The second exception to the duty to disclose is the
"therapeutic privilege." 48 This exception protects the physician from
liability for failure to disclose information, which could result in the
patient suffering physical or emotional harm. 49 Since this privilege
allows physicians to use their professional discretion to limit the
information available to patients, it appears to significantly undermine
the patient-based standard of disclosure. 50 Thus, despite the rare use
of this privilege as a ground for dismissal in court, many statutes have
codified this exception in order to allow protection for patients. 51 A
patient's right to unreasonably refuse medical treatment, however, has
diminished the "therapeutic privilege" exception.52
The third exception to the informed consent doctrine is the
patient's waiver of the disclosure, defined by the U.S. Supreme Court
as the "voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right."
53
Generally, waiver provisions become a part of state's law either by
statute or by the court's ruling.5 4 However, allowing the patient to
waive the right of informed consent may undermine public policy
concerns regarding the health and safety of patients undergoing
experimental therapies.5 5 Furthermore, a physician will not violate a
duty to disclose in cases where a reasonable patient would be
generally aware of the risks of the particular treatment or the
alternative therapy. 56 Finally, if the treatment carries a remote risk
47 Meisel, supra note 39, at 436.
48 See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
49 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1339.
50 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1338.
51 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1338, n.94 (referring to ALASKA STAT. § 09.-
55.556 (b)(4) (Miche 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (b)(3) (1989); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2805 (d)(4) (McKinney 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (2) (1989);
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 71, § 6.07 (a)(2) (West 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1909(d) (Supp. 1995)).
52 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265
(1989) (finding that the patient had a right corollary to informed consent doctrine -
namely, the right not to consent).
53 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1340 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
475-76 (1966)).
54 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1340.
55 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 509.
56 See id. (citing Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977)).
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inherent in common procedures or the physician is reasonably
unaware of the risks the physician will not be held liable for the
violation of the duty to disclose.5 7 Specifically, the physician need not
discuss insignificant risks associated with common procedures, where
the low incidence of the risks is common knowledge.
58
IV. CURRENT APPLICATION OF INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE TO
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS
Currently, physicians provide their patients with risk and
benefit characteristics of intended treatment without disclosing
alternative therapy options. Since the physician often envisions a
single reasonable course of treatment, (s)he does not realize the need
to disclose alternatives as well as possible risks to the patients.
60
Moreover, the physician is often inclined to present information in
such a manner that the patient will choose the alternative the
physician thinks preferrable. 61
However, in 1983, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that
the scope of disclosure pursuant to the informed consent requirements
is not restricted to less hazardous alternatives. 62 The court in Logan
explained that limiting the disclosure "would shift the judicial inquiry
from whether the patient has been informed of the material
alternatives, to whether the physician has recommended the least
57 See id.; see also Contreras v. St. Luke's Hosp., 144 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1978)
(holding that a physician fulfilled the duty to inform the patient of the risks inherent in
knee surgery when he told the patient of the possibility of infection, without specifying
the consequences of such an infection)..
58 Cobbs v. Grant 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
59 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 511; see also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD
OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 26 (1984).
60 See Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context:
The Special Case, 61 WASH. L. REv. 367, 373 (1986)).
61 See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379,
399-400 (1990).
62 See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp., 465 A.2d 294, 297 (Conn. 1983)). In
Logan, the court held that the physician was liable for advising the patient of kidney
biopsy by needle without mentioning the more hazardous alternative of open biopsy. Id.
942 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI
dangerous alternative. 63  According to the court's interpretation,
disclosure limited to less hazardous alternatives "wholly relieves
physicians of any obligation to discuss alternatives with their patients
and substitutes merely a duty to recommend the safest procedure. 64
Furthermore, it often happens that although physicians
disclose certain options for the patient's treatment, the physician does
not address nonreadily available alternatives.65 A good illustration of
these practices is presented in El-Amin v. Yale - New Haven
Hospital.66  In July 1988, during the twenty-third week of her
pregnancy, Deborah El-Amin was diagnosed with candida
amnionitis.67 In view of the possible health impairments which the
mother's infection could cause to her newborn child, El-Amin should
have been told of her option to have an abortion.68 However, the
Connecticut statute banned abortions after viability except when it is
necessary to preserve the health of the mother.69 As a result, Deborah
El-Amin, as a Connecticut resident, was not informed of the
alternative of abortion, even though it would have been an option in
the neighboring state of New York.7°
After giving birth to a hydrocephalic 71 child with certain
debilitating effects, Deborah El-Amin brought a lawsuit against the
hospital for failure to disclose the alternative treatment and, thus,
preventing her from giving informed consent to the best treatment
6 31 d. at 301.
64 id
65 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 492.
66 El-Amin v. Yale - New Haven Hosp., No. CV-900303287 (Conn. Super.
Ct. filed Aug. 8, 1990).
67 Terrion, supra note 27, at 492. Candida Amnionitis is an inflammation
that is caused by a yeast-like infection of the amniotic sac. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 58, 237 (25th ed. 1990).
68 See Barbara Lyne, Withheld Abortion Advice Hit; Suit Charges
Malpractice, NAT'L L.J., July 15, 1991, at 3 (referring to the plaintiff's legal theory in El-
Amin case). 69 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-602 (West Supp. 1992).
70 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1997) (stating that an abortion
"is justifiable.., within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy").
71 Hydrocephalus is a condition in infants, characterized by accumulation of
fluid under the outer or middle membrane covering the brain and spinal cord. See
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 731 (25th ed. 1990).
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available for her condition.72  Although this case settled before it
reached the trial stage, it appears that arguments similar to that of
Deborah El-Amin have not been fully accepted by the courts.7' For
instance, in Spenser v. Seikel, the court held that the physicians had no
duty to inform a pregnant woman with a viable fetus of the possibility
of abortion.74
The unwillingness of the courts to expand the limits of
physician's discretion to the usage or recommendation of alternative
treatments is also evident in the field of alternative medicine.75 Cases
involving homeopathy76, chelation therapy 77 and, ozone therapy
78
suggest that physicians face disciplinary risks when they use
alternative or complementary therapies.79 Physicians who either offer
their patients therapeutic touch,80 intuitive diagnosis, 8 1 environmental
72 See El-Amin v. Yale - New Haven Hosp., No. CV-900303287 (Conn.
Super. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 1990).
73 See generally Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987).
74 Id.
75 See COHEN, supra note 4, at xii (explaining that the term "alternative"
suggests use of the therapies as substitutes for biomedical care). To dispel the perception
that alternative medicine is nonconventional and therefore potentially dangerous, many
advocate using the term complementary. See also David Weber, The Mainstreaming of
Alternative Medicine, HEALTHCARE FORUM J., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 16, 20. By using this
nomenclature, some acknowledge that alternative medicine does not displace, but rather
complements, Western or conventional medicine. See id.
76 Homeopathy is a healing system formulated by Samuel Hahnemann in the
late eighteenth century, based on the belief that natural substances that produce certain
symptoms in healthy individuals cure those same symptoms in someone who is sick. See
Robert L. Park, Alternative Medicine and the Laws of Physics, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER,
Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 24, 25.
77 "Chelation therapy involves the use of the amino acid ethylene diamine
tetra acetic acid ("EDTA"), together with vitamins and minerals, to clean out the arteries
by breaking down arterial plaque." Cohen, supra note 8, at 113 (citing Moore v. Baker,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at 11 (S.D. Ga. 1991)).
78 Ozone therapy is an alternative cancer therapy used to avoid more invasive
medical techniques. See Atkins v. Guest, 601 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1993).
71 See id. at 234.
80 Therapeutic touch is a nursing practice based on the theory "that there is a
flow of energy from within an individual outward, and from the environment to the
individual; a therapist who understands and believes this "life force" can intentionally
manipulate a patient's energy field and produce healing." See Debunking The Theory Of
Therapeutic Touch: A Close Look at Therapeutic Touch, 7 MEDICO-LEGAL WATCH 38
(1998).
81 See generally COHEN, supra note 4, at 93.
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medicine, 82 or teach courses on alternative health care in medical
schools83 are similarly at risk of disciplinary sanctions, including loss
of license, for deviating from the current biomedical body.
84
For example, in Atkins v. Guest,85 a New York physician's use
of ozone therapy as an alternative cancer treatment made him the
target of a medical board investigation. 86  Atkin's patient was
diagnosed with breast cancer, had a mastectomy and underwent six
months of chemotherapy, which made her cancer-free for four years
until a blood test revealed the presence of cancer cells. 87 The patient
consulted Atkins who recommended ozone therapy and a nutritional
program. 88 When the patient felt weak and was sent to the hospital,
the emergency room physician who treated the woman complained to
the relevant professional authorities about Atkin's ozone therapy
treatment even though the patient was released with no apparent side
effects or injuries. 89 The Medical Disciplinary Board rejected Atkin's
assertion that he could not be legally found negligent or incompetent
merely for practicing ozone therapy.90
Those physicians that come under investigation, similar to the
doctor in Atkins, face damage to their reputation, as well as possible
loss of livelihood.91 In many cases, investigations conducted by the
82 See Gary R. Oberg, An Overview of the Philosophy of the American
Academy of Environmental Medicine, DENVER: AMERICAN ACAD. OF ENVTL. MED. 6, 9
(1992) (explaining that environmental medicine attributes disease to biologic
dysfunctions triggered by environmental stressors, such as dusts, molds, pollens, danders,
venoms, for... radiation and electro-magnetic fields) in susceptible patients).
83 See Cynthia Starr, Exploring the Other Health Care Systems - Alternative
Medicine: Part 1, PATIENT CARE, July 15, 1997, at 136 (stating that more than 30 medical
schools have added alternative medicine to their curricula).
84 See COHEN, supra note 4, at 92, 164 n.39 (citing James S. Goodwin & Jean
M. Goodwin, The Tomato Effect: Rejection of Highly Efficacious Therapies, 251:18
JAMA 2387 (1984)).
85 See Atkins v. Guest, 601 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1993).
86 See id. at 235.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 236.
89 See id. at 237.
90 See Atkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 238-39 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230
(10)(1)). The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York upheld the decision
citing the "important public interest in investigating misconduct by licensed physicians."
Id. at 657. 91 See COHEN, supra note 4, at 93 (discussing various approaches to health
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Medical Board's Disciplinary Authorities or litigation brought in court
commence because state policy often disagrees with physicians who
are willing to offer experimental, innovative, or alternative
treatments.92
V. THE "GOVERNMENT STANDARD" OF DISCLOSURE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In view of the alternative treatment cases mentioned above,
there appears to be an additional standard of disclosure which imposes
limitations on both the "reasonable physician standard" and the
"prudent patient standard" - the "government standard. 93  The
"government standard" incorporates the political views of the practice
of medicine by restricting access to medical information and
regulating the content of doctor-patient speech.94
Historically, the governments of many countries have imposed
the standards of disclosure on the information given to patients by
their physicians.95 For instance, during the Cultural Revolution in
China, the physicians were sent to villages to advocate the use of
contraceptives. 96 Likewise, during the construction of the Siberian
railroad in the 1930s, the Soviet government imposed its ideology on
the physician-patient sphere by demanding that doctors deny any
requests for medical leave by the workers. 97 Similarly, the efforts of
Nicolae Ceausescu to increase the birth rate in Romania included
directives to physicians not to advice patients or disseminate any
care freedom).
92 See id.
93 See Berg, supra note 11, at 201.
94 See J. Wells Dixon, Conant v. Mccaffrey: Physicians, Marijuana, and The
First Amendment, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 1002 (1999) (discussing a trend of federal
government to establish a system, where medical decisions are influenced by
administrative review and political and economic policies).
95 See Berg, supra note 11, at 201.
96 See Penny Kane, Family Planning in China, in HEALTH CARE AND
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE IN CHINA 1800-1982 426, 431 (S. M. Miller & J. A. Jewell eds.,
1983).
97 See MARK G. FIELD, DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN SOVIET RUSSIA 168-69
(1957).
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information about contraception.
98
In the United States, however, the government's attempts to
restrict doctor-patient speech have been limited to abortion and
contraception.99 In fact, a number of states enacted legislation,
criminalizing physician's speech about these matters. 100 Thus, the
following question may arise: does the federal government allow any
protection or guarantee to the patients and physicians in their
discussion of alternative treatment?
Among the constitutional provisions protecting the individual
sphere from government interference, the First Amendment appears to
be the most significant. 1 1 By protecting free speech from States'
intrusion, the First Amendment attempts to insure that the formation
of the "intellect and spirit" occurs in a free environment.10 2  To
achieve this goal, the First Amendment protects not only a positive
right - the right to speak or receive ideas from others - but also the
negative right - the right not to speak or not to be forced to listen to
the opinions of others. 10 3
Although the United States Supreme Court has recently
addressed the issue of the scope of disclosure in doctor-patient speech,
the Court did not rely on the First Amendment jurisprudence to
expand the rights and guarantees to patients seeking the information
necessary to make their medical decision. 10 4  Instead, the Court
98 See Reed Boland, Symposium on Population Law, The Environment,
Population, And Women's Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1167 (1997). See also
David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, How AIDS CAME TO ROMANIA, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1990, at 5 (discussing Ceausescu's "pronatal campaign").
99 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,449-50 (1985).
100 See Berg, supra note 11, at 202-03, n.9 (stating that although some states
enacted statutes criminalizing physician speech about contraception and abortion, the
statutes did not pass judicial scrutiny).
101 See generally Paula Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The
Exceptionalism of Doctor-Patient Speech Within The Rehnquist Court's First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 173 (1998).
102 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
103 Id. at 174 n.89 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970); and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
104 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations which
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allowed restriction on both accesses to alternative treatment and the
discussion of such an alternative.
10 5
One such case decided by the Rehnquist Court was Rust v.
Sullivan,'0 6 which addressed the constitutionality of regulations that
restricted the conduct'0 7 and speech of physicians working in family
planning clinics funded under Title X of the Public Health Services
Act.10 8  The speech-related regulations prohibited physicians from
providing abortion-related family planning counseling and referrals to
women. 10 9  For patients who requested referrals, the regulations
recommended a scripted response: "the project does not consider
abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does
not counsel or refer for abortion." 110 The Rehnquist Court avoided
discussion of the First Amendment free speech issue, deciding that the
regulations were a constitutional exercise of the government's power
to choose those activities eligible for federal funding."' The Court
explained that "[t]his is not the case of the Government 'suppressing a
dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its
employees from engaging in activities outside of its scope.' 112
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,113 which was decided one
year after Rust, the Court endorsed an even broader governmental
right to manipulate the content of physicians' conversations with
patients.114 Casey challenged the constitutionality of amendments to a
prohibit federally funded family planning clinics to counsel or refer patients regarding
abortion).
105 See id. at 193.
106 id.
107 See id. See also Berg, supra note i1, at 208 n.34 (referring to 42 C.F.R. §
59.9 (1991), which prohibits Title X grantees from participating in pro-choice lobbying,
legal actions and requiring separation between Title X supported projects and any
abortion related activities).
'0' See Rust, 500 U.S. 173. See also Berg, supra note 11, at 207 n.30 (citing
42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1988), which restrict the distribution of funds to family
planning services' abortion counseling).
109 See Berg, supra note 11, at 208 n.35 (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1)
(1991)).
110 See id. at 208 n.36 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1991)).
... See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
12 Id. at 194.
".3 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
114 See Berg, supra note 11, at 213.
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Pennsylvania abortion statute 1l5 that revived provisions invalidated by
the Burger Court six years earlier.'' 6 In addition to imposing various
limitations on the conduct of all Pennsylvania physicians who
performed abortions," 7 the so-called informed consent provisions
required doctors - at the risk of losing their medical license - to
provide every patient seeking an abortion with scripted information
intended to convey the State's preference for childbirth over
abortion.118  Thus, similar to the statute in Rust, the Pennsylvania
statute also directly regulated the content of physician-patient
communications in order to encourage patients to follow government
ideology in making medical decisions." 9
The Court in Casey followed the approach taken in Rust, of
disregarding possible interference with the free speech rights of
physicians or the audience-based right of patients to receive
information. 120  The Court, dismissing the concern of physician's
speech rights, stated that advising patients is is an integral part of
practicing medicine, which is subject to State's regulation and
licensing. 121  Thus, according to the plurality opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, "the state's authority to license and
regulate the medical profession includes the power to compel
physicians to communicate pre-scripted, viewpoint-based statements
to patients for the purpose of persuading them to make the medical
choices preferred by the state, as long as those statements are not false
or misleading."' 22 As such it appears that Rust and Casey represent a
115 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (West Supp. 1997).
116 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986) (reaffirming the Court's previous decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where it held that speech restrictions intended to influence
patients' decisions in accordance with governmental ideology violated the constitutional
right to privacy).
117 See Berg, supra note 11, at 213 n.73 (discussing a Pennsylvania statute
which required a married woman, seeking an abortion, to provide the physician with a
signed statement that she had notified her husband of her intention, unless the case fell
within one of four exceptions).
118 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) (West 1983 & Supp.
1997).
119 See Berg, supra note 103, at 158.
120 See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
121 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
122 id,
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disregard of physicians' and patients' freedoms, by interpreting the
First Amendment as allowing the federal government's manipulation
of the content of physician-patient speech to promote certain
ideology. 1
23
A. Restrictions on Patient's "Right to Know" About Alternative
Treatments.
In view of the modern advance in medical science and
progress in prevailing social attitudes, 24 an expansion of First
Amendment protection over the patient's right to receive information
would be justifiable. The freedom of doctor-patient communications
regarding alternative treatments is "a corollary to the right of bodily
integrity underlying the doctrine of informed consent. ' '125 It is well
settled that government restrictions on the free flow of information
undermine the basic principles of a free society. 126  In Board of
Education v. Pico,127 the Supreme Court expressly stated that "First
Amendment protection of the right to receive ideas is a 'necessary
predicate' to the 'meaningful exercise of the rights of speech, press,
and political freedom."
' 128
Patients appear to be very sensitive to government-scripted
advice given by their physicians.' 29 In fact, certain studies proved that
patients are mostly passive and deferential in their communications
with physicians, while doctors are more imposing and aggressive,
especially when patients start taking an active role in the
123 See generally Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity:
The Free Speech Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1724 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's departure from traditional
First Amendment analyses in Rust and Casey).
124 See COHEN, supra note 4, at xii.
125 Berg, supra note 11, at 238.
126 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding that the
"bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment ...is that government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
127 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
128 Id. at 867.
129 See Berg, supra note 103, at 164.
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conversations.' Most of the patients, especially those who are
financially unstable, lesser educated, young, elderly, and members of
minority groups, are reluctant to dispute the physician's authority.,3 '
Moreover, managed care may further restrict patients' inability to
challenge the opinion of physicians.1 32 As a result, patients are likely
to silently defer to the physician's advice, given in accordance with
State authority or widely accepted biomedical model.133
Some advocates of state restrictions on doctor-patient speech
have argued that the patient's right to obtain information is not
infringed by government regulations since there exist other ways to
learn about alternative treatment.' 34  A similar restriction, the "gag
rule," has been discussed in Rust, where the Supreme Court imposed a
ban on abortion discussions in publicly financed clinics.' 35 However,
the Court did not extend the restriction to privately financed
physicians, who, even under Rust, could provide patients with
abortion counseling. 136 Rust opponents have criticized the decision by
noting that "if publicly financed clinic patients had the financial
resources to obtain private health care, they would not be clinic
patients in the first place."'' 37
Moreover, before patients can seek alternative information,
they should realize the incompleteness or inaccuracy of the counseling
previously given. 138  Sometimes, the patients may be aware of an
alternative not discussed by the physician, such as an abortion.'39
130 See Debra L. Roter et. al., Communication Patterns of Primary Care
Physicians, 277 JAMA 350, 355 (1997); see also J. Middleton, Written Lists in the
Consultation: Attitudes of General Practitioners to Lists and the Patients Who Bring
Them, 44 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 309 (1994) (advocating various methods of improving
doctor-patient communications).
131 See Sherrie H. Kaplan et. al., Patient and Visit Characteristics Related to
Physicians' Participatory Decision-Making Style, 33 MED. CARE 1176, 1182-84 (1995).
132 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the
Physician-Patient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 328 (1995).
133 See Berg, supra note 103, at 165.
134 See id.
135 500 U.S. at 201.
136 See id.
137 Berg, supra note 11, at 266 n.227.
138 See id. at 248.
139 See id.
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More often, patients are simply unaware of available options, thus
bypassing an opportunity to incorporate those alternatives into the
treatment pattern. 40  As such, government limitations on the
physician-provided information undermine the patients' constitutional
right to freely make medical decisions.' 4' Thus, the best protection
against the government influence on the patients' decision-making
would be ensuring patient's entitlement to complete and accurate
medical information.
42
B. Government Restraints On Physicians 'Right To Free Speech
The "government standard" of disclosure of alternative
treatment also impairs the ability of physicians to communicate to the
patient the best possible alternative treatment. 43  First, regulations
prohibiting physicians from discussing particular treatments distort
patients' health care decisions by enhancing an incomplete
understanding of medical alternatives and thereby undermining the
possibility of authentic informed consent. 44  Second, regulations
preventing physicians' disclosure of information about particular
alternative treatments usurp patient autonomy by, allowing the
government to act as a "silent partner in medical decision making."'
145
The resulting pattern serves as an unbalanced government regulation
since patients are practically unable to acquire alternative information
through means other than visits to their regular physician.'
46
140 See Bernard M. Dickens, Book Review, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 609, 614 (1999) (reviewing George J Annas, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND
THE MARKET. NEW YORK AND OXFORD) (discussing the ways the informed conscent
doctrine induces patients to decline interventions and other proposed treatment that they
disfavor).
141 See Bethany J. Spielman, Managed Care Regulation And The Physician-
Advocate, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 713, 718 (1999) (suggesting that professional medical
advocates should supply patients with the information necessary to make informed
decisions).
142 See id.
143 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(stating that patients' right to choose medical treatment is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
'44 See id.
145 Berg, supra note 11, at 243.
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that the patients will seek advice of several
practitioners to obtain additional medical information.
47
Any limitation of physician-patient free. communication
creates an evident "viewpoint discrimination.', 148 The attempts of the
government to withhold data about certain alternative medical
procedure demonstrates government's, not patient's, choice of
treatment.149 For instance, statutory prohibitions of contraception and
abortion are simply based on government preference for other means
of family planning. 150  Further, censorship of physician's alternative
treatment advising may "destroy an essential precondition of the
meaningful exercise of patients' constitutional right to control the
course of their medical treatment."' 5' Thus, unless full information
about medical options is provided to the patients, the latter can not
exercise their right to choose or refuse treatment as provided by the
doctrine of informed consent.
152
C. Recent Positive Developments in Constitutional Protection of
Patients'Right To Know About Alternatives.
The concern over the unconstitutionality of limitations on the
information about alternative treatments was addressed in Conant v.
146 George J. Benston, Government Constraints on Political, Artistic, and
Commercial Speech, 20 CONN. L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988) (stating that the"[flear of an
imposed orthodoxy is justified where there is a significant limitation on the expression of
alternative or supplementary speech").
147 Berg, supra note 11, at 248 n.228 (explaining "[iut is financially
prohibitive for most patients to consult a number of physicians in order to obtain
complete information, and it is unlikely that insurance companies would reimburse
patients who have multiple consultations for this purpose. Even if such coverage were
available, it would likely contribute to an unnecessary increase in the overall cost of
health care.").
148 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
149 See id
150 See Kevin Francis O'Neill, The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions As
An Alternative Source Of Protection For Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 1, 71 (1993) (discussing various instances of government-compelled speech.)
'1 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
152 See id.
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McCaffrey,'53 a recent First Amendment challenge to a government
restriction on doctor-patient speech. In Conant, ten doctors, five
patients, and two non-profit organizations instituted a class action suit
after the federal government threatened to prosecute doctors who
provide counseling about Schedule I drugs to their patients.1 54
According to a Drug Enforcement Agency determination, marijuana
currently "has no accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States."' 155 However, the citizens of California, through Proposition
215 or the Compassionate Use Act,' 56 explained that marijuana is
beneficial in treating "cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain,
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine."'' 5
7
The plaintiffs challenged the government's medical marijuana
policy on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the policy has a
"chilling" effect on physician-patient communication. 58  The
plaintiffs further argued that as a result of federal statutory restrictions
on open communication "patients are less likely to tell their
physicians about marijuana use; physicians, in turn, are unable to
advise patients about safe use of marijuana or guide proper use of
marijuana for treatment; and physicians are discouraged from
recording their patients' full medical histories and progress on
medical charts."'159 The court held for the plaintiffs, -granting them a
preliminary injunction that prohibited "the federal government from
threatening or prosecuting physicians, revoking their licenses, or
excluding them from Medicare/Medicaid participation [due to] doctor-
patient communication regarding medical marijuana."'' 60
153 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that threats by federal drug
enforcement officials to prosecute physicians for advising patients about the medical use
of marijuana after enactment of the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 violated
physicians' and patients' rights under the First Amendment).
. 154 See Dominica Minore Bassett, Note, Legislative Review Medical Use And
Prescription Of Schedule I Drugs in Arizona: Is The Battle Moot?, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 441,
452 (1998) (citing Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686, 688).
155 See Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed, Reg. 10, 499 (1992).
156 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West 1996).
17 Id. at § 11362.5(a).
158 See Bassett, supra note 154, at 452.
159 See Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 691.
160 Id. at 701; see generally Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use Of
Marijuana: A Look At Federal & State Responses to California's Compassionate Use Act,
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The Conant court started its analysis by explaining that the
"case was not about doctors prescribing, growing or distributing
marijuana, or about patients buying marijuana in large quantities for
distribution."'161  Rather, the case addressed the possibilities for
physicians to advise seriously ill patients about benefits of small
amounts of medical marijuana. 162 Addressing the First Amendment
claim, the court in Conant explained that the government does not
have the right to regulate speech on the basis of content and the
message conveyed. 163  The court found that the facts of the case
presented an accurate example of content-based regulation.' 64
Namely, the government's policy of prohibiting the expression of the
physicians' opinions on marijuana was based solely on disagreement
with such views. 16
5
In distinguishing between allowable and impermissible
communication, the court stated that doctor-patient communications
must not involve "criminally aiding and abetting a patient's illegal
purchase, cultivation, or possession of marijuana, or conspiracy to
cultivate, distribute, or possess marijuana."' 66 The court pointed out
that although marijuana itself is illegal, the First Amendment does not
prohibit physicians from discussing and advocating medical
marijuana. 167 Accordingly, the court concluded that physicians should
have the First Amendment right to discuss and advocate the medical
use of marijuana, as long as their advocacy does not incite or produce
inevitable unlawful action.' 68 The decision in Conant is remarkable as
2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 155, 156 (1997) (discussing the states' positions on medical
use of marijuana and the roles of physicians is disseminating the information about the
marijuana treatments).
161 See Basset, supra note 154, at 453 (discussing Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686).
162 See id; see also Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686.
163 See Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 694.
164 See id.
165 See id.; see generally Nicole Dogwill, The Burning Question: How Will
The United States Deal With The Medical- Marijuana Debate?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 247,
253 (1998)(discussing the government viewpoint restrictions on doctor-patient speech
regarding medical use of marijuana).
166 See Bassett, supra note 161, at 453 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21
U.S.C. § 846).
167 See Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 695.
168 See id.
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it presents an example of the willingness of the judiciary to allow
constitutional protection to both physicians and patients in their
communications regarding alternative treatments.
169
In addition, legislative effort enhancing physician's freedom
to offer innovative, experimental, or complementary and alternative
treatments is also under way.1 70 Several states have already enacted
statutes which .allow physicians to protect patients without ratifying
the distrust in alternative treatments. 171 For instance, the legislation in
New York State allows a licensed physician to use "whatever medical
care, conventional or non-conventional, . . . effectively treats human
disease, pain, injury, deformity, or physical condition., 172  The
legislation also provides for the establishment of a board for
professional medical conduct which should include at least two
physicians "who dedicate a significant portion of their practice to the
use of non-conventional medical treatments."
' 7 3
Furthermore, Managed Care Organizations ("MCO's") began
embracing alternative care, thus enhancing development and trust in
alternative therapies and encouraging the dissemination of pertinent
information.1 74  As such, patients may feel justified in demanding
alternative treatment from their physicians, if such treatment is
covered by their health plans. 75 Physicians, in turn, may be pressured
by MCOs that include an alternative health network or alternative
therapies as covered benefits. 1
76
These measures are likely to increase the freedom of
169 See Dixon, supra n. 94, at 1013.
170 See generally COHEN, supra note 4, at 60.
171 See ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.326 (Michie 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
230 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (A) (6) (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
59, §509.1 (D) (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1)(D) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 18.130.180 (4) (West 1991).
172 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527 (4)(E) (McKinney 1999).
173 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney 1994).
174 See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Oxford to Create Alternative Medicine
Network, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1996, at B9; see also Susan Jackson, Not Everything
Oxford Did Needs Repair, Bus. WK., Mar. 9, 1998, at 38 (noting that alternative medicine
costs Oxford little while being a significant source of positive publicity).
175 See generally Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine Opens the Door to
Alternative Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 202-03 (1998).
176 See id. at 203.
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physicians to recommend or use alternative treatments for willing
patients. 77 Furthermore, the judicial and legislative efforts towards
broadening the scope of disclosure in doctor-patient communication
will assure and protect the patient's right to receive all of the
necessary information in order to give an informed consent to the
treatment.17
8
CONCLUSION.
The developments in medical care in recent years have
increased concerns about the scope of the disclosure which physicians
should give to their patients. 179 The disclosure requirement becomes
especially important where certain innovative, experimental,
complementary, or alternative treatments exist, which may be
necessary for the patients.' 80  According to the established
interpretations of the informed consent doctrine, the courts have
assessed the appropriateness of physician's disclosure based on
medical community standards as well as "prudent patient"
standards.' 81 However, due to the possible risks associated with these
treatments, the government assumed control of certain doctor-patient
communications, thereby creating a third, "government standard.' 182
The recent Supreme Court view on the role of the government in the
physician-patient relationship is troubling. 183  Even though First
Amendment jurisprudence generally protects the patient's right to free
access to information and the physicians' right to free speech, the
Court affirms the ideological role of the government as a "silent
partner" in doctor-patient relationships.' 84
Nevertheless, certain state courts and legislative bodies have
177 See Wayne Jonas, Alternative Medicine and the Conventional
Practitioner, 279 JAMA 708, 708 (1998) (stating that alternative treatments are
frequently less expensive than conventional therapies).
178 See id.
179 See Terrion, supra note 27, at 502 n.48.
180 See COHEN, supra note 4, at 93.
181 See Terrion, supra, note 27, at 502 n.48.
182 See generally Berg, supra note 11, at 201.
183 See id. at 205.
114 See id. at 205-06.
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demonstrated a positive trend in enhancing the medical freedom of the
physicians to counsel, and implementing alternative treatments, as
well as promoting the patient's right to receive all of the necessary
information to make a medical decision.'8 5 These constitutional and
statutory guarantees, if followed by most states, will effectively
expand the provisions of the informed consent doctrine to the field of
alternative treatments, thereby promoting the health and safety of the
population. 186
Anna Karpman
185 See COHEN, supra note 4, at 93.
186 See id
20001 57

